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If Francis Fukuyama can get it wrong about the end of history, I can take such a risk about the new regional order in the Middle East. Amid all its complexity, there might be a simple solution to the region’s problems and it all boils down to coming to terms with the phenomenon of political Islam, with its various manifestations. Please note that I said “simple,” I did not say “easy.”

What I am trying to explain is that the new order may have one major challenge instead of a multiplicity of smaller ones. In every conflict in the region, if one digs deep enough, we find at its root an as-yet-unresolved relationship between religion and state. This is not specific to the Middle East, Europe struggled with this one for centuries. It may not even be a problem with religion; it is probably much more of a problem with the state. Religions have been there for centuries, states are the newcomers.

Relations between Islam and the state were much healthier in the liberal first half of the 20th century, before a new order of secular nationalists came about in the early 1950s and suppressed religion. Under the oppressive boot of military dictatorships, religion was radicalized and radicalism became contagious, spreading across the region through Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi militants.

There is little doubt that change is happening in the region. As if the advent of Donald Trump as president of the US was not enough, the Gaza war has shaken up the region, with Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen all joining in through their nonstate actors — Islamist militias with links to Iran. These were the culmination of the Shiite revival that started in Iran in the 1950s, spreading through the region and becoming radicalized under suppression by the shah and Saddam Hussein.

In every conflict in the region, if one digs deep enough, we find at its root an as-yet-unresolved relationship between religion and state

Nadim Shehadi

The collapse of the Assad regime complicated matters but also made us revise our ideas. It all came too suddenly and challenged our perceptions and understanding of radical Sunni Islam. World leaders are sending their officials to snoop around and figure out the new Syrian leadership, while also meeting President Ahmad Al-Sharaa on the sidelines of international events.

Even the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the point of being resolved 30 years ago, when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords. That was until it became a problem between the PLO and Hamas, and it still is: the state represented by the PLO needs to find a way to coexist with a radicalized version of political Islam. It is true that Hamas won the 2006 elections, but that was almost two decades ago and a whole new generation has been born since. The EU and the US, which pushed for the elections to be held, had to reject the outcome and there have not been any elections since.

In Egypt, where the institution of the army has dominated politics since the 1950s, relations with the Muslim Brotherhood are also unresolved. Elections in 2011 after the so-called Arab Spring brought in Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, but a massive popular revolt brought him down. There are similar complex relations between the state and political Islam in Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. Unresolved relations between religion and state may become part of a global revolt against politicians.

But again, it is not a simple division between religious and secular people. There is significant overlap, with individuals sometimes crossing from one side to the other. The French debate over radical Islam is interesting, particularly the analysis of Olivier Roy, who says that it is not Islam that is radicalized, it is radicalization that is Islamized. I tend to agree with this and there is plenty of evidence to support it, with Marxists and nationalists having joined Islamist movements, particularly in the 1980s. For them, religion was seen as a useful tool to recruit followers, in the same way Latin American liberation theology used Catholicism.

Two cases are illustrative of this phenomenon. Firstly, the Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh initially trained with the PLO in Lebanon. Part of the reason for him shifting allegiance was the PLO’s support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. The second is the case of a Christian Palestinian member of the PLO’s student brigade, Munir Shafiq. Shafiq was a Maoist who converted to Sunni Islam and had great influence through his writings.

The main division in Israel is between the religious and the secular elements of society, both of which can go to extremes

Nadim Shehadi

Israel is also not immune to this problem of the relationship between religion and state. The main division in the country is between the religious and the secular elements of society, both of which can go to extremes. Radical religious parties can have far more influence because of the particularities of the electoral system. Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, operation also helped radical Jewish politicians win more support. Radicals from both sides indirectly support each other.

Turkiye is a perfect example of this division between religious and secular tendencies. Even Iran is changing. I am told by Iranian friends that in some areas of Tehran you might think you are in Paris, with art galleries and music concerts attended by a mixed audience and with women barely wearing their headscarves.

I may have simplified a complex problem for the sake of understanding it better. A new order in the region will have to resolve the issue of the relationship between religion and state, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Every society will have to find its own way of dealing with this regionwide challenge.

A new order is not announced on state television or through communiques; it evolves by millions of individuals going through a process of revising their ideas. We do not need aid, we need to get our act together. After more than 70 turbulent years in the history of the region, a new generation may be looking for something better.

• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus