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Two divergent Egyptian diplomatic efforts have caught the attention of analysts. First, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi met Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on May 7 to reaffirm the commitment of both to a proposed 3,000-megawatt North Africa-Europe undersea electricity cable. On the same day, Egyptian Public Business Sector Minister Mohammed Shimi met the Turkish Sahinler Group Board Chairman Kemal Sahin to explore investment opportunities. While these developments differ in nature, they highlight Egypt’s attempts to build commercial and strategic ties with both Greece and Turkiye.

Turkiye and Egypt have ostensibly grown closer in recent years, as a decade-long diplomatic rift over support for the Muslim Brotherhood gave way to presidential exchanges in 2024. The relationship has become strategically important for both sides amid the geopolitical and economic volatility in the region. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $8.8 billion and the two countries signed at least 17 memorandums of understanding on partnership in various sectors, including trade, defense and energy, with the aim of boosting trade to $15 billion annually.

On the other hand, Egypt shares cordial relations with Greece and, in 2024, the two countries exchanged nearly $2 billion in trade. Egypt is cooperating with Greece to enhance energy exports to Europe at a time when the continent’s energy supply is insecure. The EU’s financial support for the undersea cable project highlights how critical this project is for diversifying energy sources and securing the Eastern Mediterranean. The Gaza war has underscored the fragility of energy infrastructure in conflict zones and highlighted the interconnectedness of regional energy markets.

Egypt seeks to become a regional energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean, leveraging its gas reserves and strategic location

Zaid M. Belbagi

The agreement is also part of the broader spirit of collaboration between Egypt and Greece, as seen in 2020, when the two countries signed a maritime agreement delineating their exclusive economic zones. Turkiye declared this as “null and void.” Interestingly, the maritime deal was announced shortly after a similar agreement between Turkiye and the Libyan Government of National Unity in 2019. Regional dynamics have changed since then, with the rapprochement between Egypt and Turkiye.

Although Egypt’s relations with Greece and Turkiye are improving, the Turco-Greek relationship continues to be marked with disputes and differences. Only five years ago, tensions between the two escalated over maritime boundaries around Cyprus and natural gas exploration rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nonetheless, a glimmer of hope emerged in 2023, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Athens, followed by Mitsotakis’ trip to Istanbul in the summer of 2024.

Indeed, the two countries have shown a willingness to bring stability back to the Mediterranean region and improve diplomatic ties. At the UN General Assembly in late 2024, they even appointed their foreign ministers to assess the possibility of negotiations over the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones. However, fundamentally competing energy interests and maritime boundaries will challenge this reconciliation. Energy and hydrocarbon resources have become increasingly insecure since 2022. While this makes cooperation in energy security necessary, it also makes control over energy supply lucrative for all parties.

In this context, Egypt’s attempt to strengthen cooperation with both sides is notable. It could either succeed in fostering trilateral cooperation or embroil itself in a zero-sum game between the two rivals. However, these bilateral partnerships are not only an Egyptian attempt to counterbalance adversaries. They are also critical for Egypt to gain a foothold in an increasingly multipolar world order.

Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Egypt has gained some importance as a regional mediator and investments from the UAE, ������Ƶ and Turkiye have enhanced its economic standing. Simultaneously, Egypt seeks to become a regional energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean, leveraging its gas reserves and strategic location. It is also exploring the potential to import natural gas and liquify and reexport it, given the economic value of this exercise.

Cairo must maintain a delicate balance between the two historical rivals. If successful, its role will be cemented

Zaid M. Belbagi

Should the proposed undersea cable project prove successful, it will elevate Egypt’s position as a gateway to North Africa and a regional leader in renewable energy. In today’s times, being a pivotal energy hub between Africa and Europe is more valuable than ever. Hence the strategic maneuvering in the Eastern Mediterranean and attempt to balance relationships with both Greece and Turkiye.

Egypt’s undersea cable agreement with Greece is not only a strategic move but also an economic necessity for the North African state as it seeks alternative and sustainable revenue. However, Cairo will be wary of antagonizing Turkiye, given the latter’s outsized economic, military and diplomatic role not only in Egypt but also its neighborhood. From Libya to Sudan to Somalia, Turkiye’s strategic influence in Africa makes it increasingly critical for Cairo to cooperate with it. Given Ankara’s past attempts to obstruct the Greece-Cyprus-Israel Great Sea Interconnector project, Turkish opposition remains a concern.

Cairo must maintain a delicate balance between the two historical rivals. If successful, Egypt’s role as a key mediator in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern political landscape will be cemented. As per the prospects of trilateral cooperation, gone are the days of the Ptolemaic Empire, when the predecessors of these three states were under one flag. Today, long-standing political rivalries and diverging energy and economic interests get in the way of meaningful cooperation. Whether Egypt can change this regional dynamic remains to be seen.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council. X: @Moulay_Zaid