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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have many challenges, not least as some of the most vulnerable climate change nations in the region. However, rarely a month goes by in which world powers do not double down on their diplomatic wooing of them.

Earlier this month, for instance, Beijing signed the China-Central Asia Energy and Power Innovation Alliance. This aims to boost innovation and cooperation in power technology for sustainable development.

However, China is just one of many key world powers devoting more focus to the region, owing in large part to its abundance of critical minerals for clean energy technologies. Take the example of Central Asia’s huge deposits of natural mineral resources which include around 40 percent of global supplies of manganese ore, 30 percent of chromium, 20 percent of lead, and 10 percent of titanium.

Little wonder that a wider range of powers, including Russia, Japan, the US, and Europe, are paying close attention. Russia’s interest in the region is long-standing and, of course, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were formerly part of the Soviet Union and are now members or associate members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, China has increasingly sought influence in Central Asia, including through its Belt and Road agenda. Beijing has become the region’s leading trade partner.

Moscow remains very much in the game of regional influence, however, including in energy politics. In 2023, for instance, Russia intensified exports of gas to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan after demand fell from Europe after the Ukraine war began.

While Russia and China, which share an agenda of promoting political stability of the region’s regimes, have the upper economic hand in the region, there is a narrowing window of opportunity for other powers to deepen ties too. This was shown last year when Kazakhstan refused to apply for full membership of BRICS, despite encouragement from Russia and China, and only later agreed with Uzbekistan to accept partner status.

This shows how much Central Asian leaderships want to engage a wide range of powers, not just Moscow and Beijing. The Central Asia agenda promoted by other powers, including Europe, the US, and Japan, focuses more on promoting democracy and regional economic integration.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for instance, Europe’s interest in Central Asia has intensified in a bid to diversify global supply chains, including for the green and digital transitions that will power future prosperity. This EU-driven agenda was showcased last month when the bloc hosted its first-ever summit with Central Asia.

Europe’s interest in Central Asia has intensified in a bid to diversify global supply chains.

Andrew Hammond

The agenda focused on four key areas of the EU’s Global Gateway scheme. This initiative will disburse some €300 billion across the world in the period to 2027, including sustainable energy, critical raw materials, digital connectivity, and transport.

Key EU Global Gateway commitments so far to Central Asia include the digital transformation of Kyrgyzstan. Plus also Turkmenistan‘s economic enhancement, including helping it to join the World Trade Organization.

On the transport front, since 2022 the EU has pushed for a major Trans-Caspian International Transport Route land and sea initiative (also called the Middle Corridor) to boost its presence in the region, which traverses not only Central Asia, but also the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkiye. While the Middle Corridor is not yet a serious competitor to the long-standing Northern Route, which passes through Russia, the EU is investing much in it to change that.

The EU is already Kazakhstan’s leading trade and investment partner. The last couple of decades has also seen huge foreign direct investment from the EU to the wider region.

Monies from the EU have been buttressed by other European governments and wider bodies, including the European Investment Bank, and European Bank on Reconstruction and Development. For instance, the EIB has signed an agreement with the Development Bank of Kazakhstan for a multi-million-dollar framework loan for sustainable projects.

It is not just the EU, but also individual member states including Germany and France forging close ties with Central Asia. Kazakhstan is, for instance, the biggest producer of uranium in the world with over 40 percent of world supply. Amid competition with Russia for these resources, France wants to engage more on this agenda given the importance of nuclear power to its economy.

Under the Biden administration, the US held its first summit with Central Asia under the so-called C5+1 format with Washington also throwing its support behind the Middle Corridor project. While it is not fully clear yet how much emphasis US President Donald Trump will give to the region, his America First agenda will surely also see him seeking to secure a greater share of Central Asia’s natural resource wealth.

Japan is also doubling down on ties with the region via a “Central Asia Plus Japan” dialogue. Japan has a positive influence in the region, and has been a significant donor of aid for much of the post-Cold War period.

Yet another power jockeying for position is Turkiye, which shares a common heritage with Central Asia. The Organization of Turkic States also includes Turkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

One of Turkiye’s recent initiatives in the region is a new natural gas deal that will see Turkmenistan ship natural gas via Iran. Gas supplies under the contract began to Turkiye on March 1.

Taken together, Russia and China therefore have the upper economic hand in the region. However, competition is only likely to intensify with growing interest from other powers, including Europe, the US, Japan, and Turkiye, all seeking to tap the region’s resource richness.

• Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.