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It has been about 150 days since Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam took office. On the one hand, Lebanon is experiencing its best chapter in two decades. On the other hand, there are concerns about the slow pace of progress — and that another war is on the verge of erupting.

Regardless of whether the fighters on either side of the Litani River are preparing for a decisive battle — which is unlikely — the road is long before Lebanon can fully reclaim its sovereignty from both Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli forces still occupy Lebanese land and Hezbollah has handed over only a fraction of its weapons — barely the tip of the iceberg.

The repeated rhetoric in both leaders’ speeches about the “Israeli enemy” carries no real weight today, nor is it necessary in modern political discourse.

The bitter truth, for some, is this: it is Israel — not the Lebanese authorities — that will determine the shape of Hezbollah’s future. Israel will define its size, the limits of its capabilities and its influence.

Al-Sharaa did not attack Israel in his speeches. Nor did he inflate statements with false claims of confrontations and victories.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Neighboring Syria is facing a similar situation, but it has chosen a different approach. Bashar Assad’s regime has collapsed, just like Hezbollah’s grip has weakened, leaving behind a complex legacy to navigate with the region’s “superpower” neighbor. Israeli forces are also present on Syrian soil and continue to frequently target Syrian sites.

Amid this complex situation, President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s government has managed to turn crisis into opportunity — and has earned global praise not only for what it has done, but for what it has deliberately chosen not to do. It quickly abandoned the head-in-the-sand approach of previous regimes, which failed to address internal and external politics with realism.

Al-Sharaa did not attack Israel in his speeches. He did not mobilize his forces or instruct his militias to clash or even respond to Israeli fire. Nor did he inflate government statements with false claims of confrontations and victories. In fact, he never even referred to Israel as “the enemy,” nor did he reject mediation or negotiations with the “evil” neighbor. He made it clear: his goal is to stabilize war-torn Syria — not destabilize those around it.

Lebanon’s president and prime minister come from elite circles — military and civilian, respectively. Salam is a graduate of the Sorbonne in France and Harvard in the US — arguably the most internationally qualified leader in Lebanese political history. In contrast, Al-Sharaa is a product of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham and had seen nothing of the world before assuming power, except what lay between Iraq’s Anbar and Syria’s Idlib.

Lebanon today has a rare opportunity — perhaps once in 40 years — to end decades of foreign domination.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

You do not need a magnifying glass to see that Al-Sharaa has advanced Syria’s recovery, securing deals with both friendly and hostile powers. He has neutralized threats from Israel, Iran, Iraqi factions and US sanctions — through dialogue — and has lured foreign investors with contracts to build and operate airports, ports, energy facilities and industrial projects.

We recognize that the challenges in Beirut differ from those in Damascus. Nevertheless, Lebanon today has a rare opportunity — perhaps once in 40 years — to end decades of foreign domination, from the Palestinians to the Syrians and now the Iranians. This moment demands flexibility and a new approach, unlike the rigid policies of the past.

Hezbollah has only three possible futures. First, it could return as a cross-border regional force, threatening Israel, managing Yemen’s Houthis and operating in Syria and Iraq. But that now seems impossible given Israel’s insistence on a policy of preempting any force that poses a threat to its borders.

Note that Egypt, Jordan and Syria — under their treaties with Israel — agreed to regulate weapon types and distances from the border, something Hezbollah used to reject. Yet, under last year’s ceasefire agreement, it accepted withdrawing from the south of the Litani River, surrendering its heavy weapons and military production platforms, and dismantling its infrastructure.

Second, Hezbollah could reposition itself as a purely local force. This would require acknowledging the shift in the balance of power and abandoning its role as a threat to Israel or as a bargaining chip for Iran. It may try to keep its weapons to maintain dominance in Lebanon. To counter that, Lebanese and Israeli authorities could cooperate — Israel providing Beirut with intelligence on hidden arms and the Lebanese side carrying out raids and seizures.

But Hezbollah is skilled at the game of hiding — though the current environment is tougher than before. This time, there is no escape, even after sidelining US mediator Morgan Ortagus, whom Hezbollah and its allies portray as Benjamin Netanyahu’s puppet. The reality is that it is Israel — not the US — that now dictates Lebanon’s course. This is underscored by the unprecedented scale of recent Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs.

The Lebanese presidency has promised to restore full state sovereignty by disarming Hezbollah and ending Lebanon’s role as a proxy warfront. So far, it has not succeeded. Without this, the country will remain fragile and investment will stay limited. Lebanon’s future over the next 10 to 20 years hinges on what happens in these very days, transforming the country from a militia playground into a sovereign state focused on its internal affairs and the needs of its citizens.

This is exactly what Al-Sharaa is doing in Syria — with courage and cunning — even though his circumstances are arguably far more difficult and dangerous than those faced by Lebanon’s leadership. And it is false to claim that the world simply rushed to support Al-Sharaa — not at all. He set his priorities clearly, forged his own alliances and refused to be blackmailed by local or regional propaganda about “jihad” or the “enemy.” His task now is to fight the remnants and separatists, repair the economy and focus on rebuilding a state that has been collapsing since the end of the Cold War.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al-Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. X: @aalrashed