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On a scorching morning in early June, the border triangle where Sudan, Egypt and Libya meet appeared calm as usual. Yet, beneath that stillness, the embers of a hidden conflict were about to ignite.
On June 6, a serious clash occurred when a unit from the Subul Al-Salam Battalion, which is affiliated with the forces led by Khalifa Haftar, advanced 3 km into Sudanese territory near Jabal Al-Uwaynat. The Libyan force encountered Sudanese elements from the joint forces, backed by the Sudanese army. Soon after, a video surfaced showing a Rapid Support Forces commander ordering his men to retreat from Egyptian territory, affirming: “This is not our land.” This was no isolated incident — it was a clear signal of the increasingly entangled front lines between Sudan, Egypt and Libya, and of the Sudanese civil war spilling into a broader regional arena.
The border triangle — also adjacent to northern Chad — is one of the region’s most geopolitically sensitive areas. This remote desert expanse is a porous corridor for smuggling networks and transnational armed groups. Following the Qaddafi regime’s collapse in 2011, it became a hotbed of lawlessness and a junction for arms, gold and drug smuggling, as well as irregular migrant trafficking. The discovery of gold flowing from northern Darfur through Libya and Niger to Mauritania between 2011 and 2014 added more fuel to the conflict over smuggling routes.
The reaction to last month’s incident was swift. The Sudanese army issued a statement the next day, accusing Haftar’s forces of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces in attacking Sudanese military positions, forcing them to evacuate. Meanwhile, on June 11, the militia announced via Telegram that it had gained full control of the area. This confirmed that control of the triangle had shifted to the Rapid Support Forces and its allies — an important shift in the course of the Sudanese war.
Haftar’s Libyan National Army denied Sudan’s accusations, calling them an attempt to “confuse the situation and export Sudan’s internal crisis.” Haftar’s command urged the Sudanese army not to drag it into the conflict.
Haftar appears to view Sudan not just as a neighbor, but as a vulnerable flank ripe for exploitation. He sees in Rapid Support Forces leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, a useful ally, especially since his group controls major gold mines in Darfur and Kordofan, with their proceeds funding his war effort. As a result, the alliance has turned southern Libya and the border triangle into part of Sudan’s war theater. Libya’s involvement is not ideological or official but is driven by military and commercial interests. It also offers geopolitical leverage — Haftar’s influence along the Chad-Sudan frontier strengthens his regional hand.
These developments place Egypt in a sensitive position. Cairo maintains a close relationship with Haftar, whom it sees as a key ally for stability in eastern Libya and securing its western border. At the same time, it backs the Sudanese army under Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan as the legitimate authority and a bulwark against Sudanese chaos. Reports of Haftar-backed forces supporting the Rapid Support Forces present Egypt with a dilemma.
Securing the southern border with Sudan is a top priority for Egypt’s national security. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has warned that state collapse or the spread of militias in Sudan would directly threaten Egypt. An escalation in northern Sudan could trigger refugee waves and the infiltration of armed or terrorist elements. Egypt was alarmed by the images of clashes involving Libyan forces allied to it and a Sudanese militia it considers a red line. Rapid Support Forces consolidation in the triangle poses a threat to Egypt’s national security, especially given its mistrust of the militia.
Cairo is also wary of alienating Haftar. Egypt has invested politically and militarily in Haftar’s forces to stabilize its western border and contain any spillover from Libya. Analysts suggest Egypt has adopted a pragmatic tactic. Publicly, it issued a diplomatic statement urging “restraint and respect for Sudan’s sovereignty,” without directly naming Haftar. Behind the scenes, it is believed to have taken steps to prevent future incidents. Egyptian experts warn that Cairo must act before Hemedti solidifies his foothold. A prolonged Rapid Support Forces presence could turn the triangle into a forward base or haven for mercenaries, complicating efforts to dislodge them.
These developments are tied to intense diplomatic activity. In the last week of June, high-level meetings directly linked to the crisis took place. On June 30, El-Sisi received Haftar in the coastal city of El-Alamein. The Egyptian president reiterated that “Libya’s stability is an integral part of Egypt’s national security.” Though the official statement focused on Libya, analysts believe the Sudanese file was central in the closed-door talks.

This remote desert expanse is a porous corridor for smuggling networks and transnational armed groups.

Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy

The same day, Al-Burhan made an unannounced arrival in Cairo from Spain. He held an urgent meeting with El-Sisi in El-Alamein, where they discussed military developments in the triangle. El-Sisi reaffirmed Egypt’s support for Sudan’s unity and expressed readiness to assist the Sudanese people. Sudanese sources said the meeting focused primarily on the “border triangle crisis” and ways for Cairo and Khartoum to coordinate.
The simultaneous presence of Haftar and Al-Burhan in Egypt likely was not coincidental. Diplomatic sources suggest Cairo attempted to arrange a backchannel meeting to ease tensions. However, broader calculations may have prevented a direct encounter. Still, Egypt’s message was clear: Haftar must proceed cautiously and Al-Burhan has Cairo’s backing.
Meanwhile, in mid-June, Hemedti issued remarks following his forces’ capture of the triangle and another zone called Karb Al-Toum in northern Darfur. He stated: “Some parties tried to drive a wedge between me and Cairo — they will not succeed anymore.” This was seen as an attempt to win Egypt over by signaling that he does not seek confrontation.
These developments reveal Egypt is walking a delicate diplomatic tightrope. It reassures Al-Burhan of Cairo’s support, reminds Haftar of their partnership and subtly warns Hemedti. Egypt now finds itself balancing two allies — Haftar in the west and Al-Burhan in the south — while trying to prevent their conflict from becoming its own.

• Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. X: @ALMenawy