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The British government recently announced that HMS Lancaster, a Royal Navy frigate permanently based in the Gulf, will return to the UK for scrapping by the end of the year. This will leave the UK without a permanent forward-based destroyer or frigate in the Gulf for the first time in many years. The decision comes at a bad time, given the fragile state of maritime security in the region. The removal of Britain’s last warship from the Gulf, despite these realities, is reminiscent of US President Joe Biden’s 2013 decision to withdraw all American tanks from Europe for the first time since the Second World War — only to see Russia invade Ukraine the following year.

The Gulf region matters to the UK for many reasons. Britain’s ties with the Gulf states stretch back decades, and in some cases centuries. The first recorded instance of the Royal Navy entering the Gulf occurred in 1620, when the East India Company sought to dislodge Portuguese influence from the region. Economically, the Gulf is one of the UK’s most important trading regions outside Europe and North America, with billions in goods and services exchanged each year. British companies are heavily involved in the energy, finance, and defense sectors, while Gulf investment plays a major role in the UK economy, from infrastructure projects to property and technology ventures.

Security cooperation has been just as important. Many Gulf countries have served alongside British forces in joint operations, whether in counter-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa, counter-terrorism missions in the wider Middle East, or maritime security cooperation in the Gulf itself. These shared missions have built strong operational ties and mutual trust between the UK and its Gulf partners, strengthening both regional stability and the global commons.

Gulf investment plays a major role in the British economy

Luke Coffey

The UK military continues to play a significant role in training and, in some cases, equipping the armed forces of the region, fostering close professional bonds among senior officers. The Royal Navy, in particular, holds a special place, with the UK ranking second only to the US in terms of foreign naval influence in the Gulf. The UK has also reduced its mine countermeasures vessels in the region, a vital asset given Iran’s repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. A Royal Fleet Auxiliary support ship traditionally stationed in the Gulf has also been brought home, with no plans for its return.

The Labour government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review, a document it describes as a “root-and-branch” analysis of Britain’s national security and armed forces, runs to 144 pages, but devotes only about half a page to the Gulf. It does highlight, though concisely, the importance of the region, stating: “The Middle East is significant to UK security and prosperity due to its position as an artery of global trade and its role in global energy supplies. The UK’s footprint in the region and increased investment in strategic defense partnerships supports the government’s economic growth agenda.”

If Prime Minister Keir Starmer truly sees the Gulf as a geopolitical priority, his first year in government has done little to prove it. By contrast, when the Conservatives returned to power in 2010 after 13 years in opposition, David Cameron moved quickly to elevate relations with the region. He immediately launched the Gulf Initiative, a cross-government effort to deepen relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. This paid off handsomely. In 2011 alone, UK exports to Gulf countries exceeded those to India, Russia, and Mexico combined. By contrast, under Starmer there has been no comparable deepening of relations, apart from the approaching completion of a GCC–UK free trade agreement — an effort that began under the previous Conservative government.

The removal of HMS Lancaster from the Gulf and its scrapping by the end of this year is part of a wider maritime crunch facing the Royal Navy. Once Lancaster leaves service, the fleet will be reduced to just six destroyers and six frigates — the lowest number in modern history. This downsizing comes at a time when global shipping volumes are increasing and the threats to maritime trade are growing. For a globally engaged, free-trading island nation such as Britain, these choices are difficult to reconcile with its strategic posture.

Under Starmer there has been no deepening of relations

Luke Coffey

In the 2025 Strategic Defense Review, Starmer reaffirmed that the UK would pursue a “NATO-first” policy — an approach that makes sense. Yet this does not mean Britain can neglect other key regions, particularly the Middle East.

In recent years, NATO has moved to strengthen ties with the Gulf states and expand cooperation on issues such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, and regional stability. One of NATO’s strengths is that different member states bring different contributions to the table. Since Britain is a global power with global interests, its reach and capabilities help NATO act more effectively beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The UK’s decision to scale back its naval presence in the Gulf runs counter to this dynamic, undermining one of the most significant ways Britain can contribute to NATO’s efforts in the Middle East.

Britain cannot afford to send the wrong message to friends or foes about its staying power in strategically vital regions. The Gulf is not only a hub of global commerce and energy but also a testing ground for Britain’s ability to project influence and safeguard the rules-based order beyond Europe. If the UK truly intends to be a global power with global interests, then maintaining a credible, visible, and capable naval presence in the Gulf must remain a priority — not an afterthought.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey