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LONDON: Within hours of Monday’s press conference at the White House, it seemed the whole world was ready to enthusiastically embrace the 20-point peace plan proposed by US President Donald Trump and — with a certain degree of arm-twisted reluctance — accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But with the best will of the world, say observers, the survivability of the peace plan depends on neither Trump nor Netanyahu, but on two factions not consulted in its creation: Hamas and the right-wing members of Netanyahu’s government, who see any form of peace with Hamas as a betrayal and capitulation.

According to Qatar, the Hamas delegation in Doha has agreed to study the peace proposal “responsibly.” Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority said it welcomed “the sincere and determined efforts of President Donald J Trump to end the war on Gaza and affirms its confidence in his ability to find a path toward peace.”

But if they so choose, the right-wing members of Netanyahu’s cabinet could force the collapse of his government, triggering an election in the new year and imperiling the peace process.

As part of Monday’s unfolding drama in Washington, Netanyahu picked up the phone while sitting in the Oval Office with Trump and apologized to Mohammed Al-Thani, Qatar’s prime minister, for Israel’s attack on Hamas delegates in Doha on Sept. 9.

It was patently obvious that Trump had insisted on the call, during which, according to a White House release, Netanyahu “expressed his deep regret that Israel’s missile strike against Hamas targets in Qatar unintentionally killed a Qatari serviceman.”

He “further expressed regret that, in targeting Hamas leadership during hostage negotiations, Israel violated Qatari sovereignty and affirmed that Israel will not conduct such an attack again in the future.”

The call was made just before Trump and Netanyahu emerged to present the peace plan to the world.

The fury with which Netanyahu’s far-right cabinet members, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, greeted the Qatar apology was a sign of the trouble ahead for both the Israeli PM and the peace plan.

Smotrich said “a groveling apology to a state that supports and funds terror” was “a disgrace,” comparing it to former British prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of the Nazis in 1938.

By Tuesday, at least one of the threads of the peace plan was already showing signs of unravelling.

Back home and now facing his domestic audience, Netanyahu was quick to make clear that he had not agreed to a Palestinian state and that “it is not written in the agreement either.” He added: “We are firmly opposed to a Palestinian state. President Trump also said this; he said he understands our position.”

But this is not entirely true — a juggling with the truth that will not have escaped the notice of those pressing for Palestinian statehood, from Hamas to the 159 of the 193 UN member states that now recognize a State of Palestine, and which bodes ill for the long-term health of the peace plan.

Point 9 of the plan envisages that “Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee … with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the Board of Peace.”

This, it adds, would remain in place until “such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including … the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza.”

The Saudi-French proposal, of course, envisages all such steps as leading ultimately to Palestinian statehood. Indeed, Clause 19 of the Trump plan itself identifies statehood as the ultimate goal.

“While Gaza re-development advances and when the (Palestinian Authority) reform program is faithfully carried out,” it reads, “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.”

In a joint statement, the foreign ministers of ������Ƶ, Jordan, the UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkiye, Qatar and Egypt backed the peace plan, declaring their “readiness to engage positively and constructively with the US and the parties toward finalizing the agreement and ensuring its implementation, in a manner that ensures peace, security and stability for the peoples of the region.”

But, in the wake of a series of recent international recognitions of Palestinian statehood, the sticking point for the peace deal may yet be found in the unflinching demand by the eight countries in the same statement for “a just peace on the basis of the two-state solution, under which Gaza is fully integrated with the West Bank in a Palestinian state in accordance with international law as key to achieving regional stability and security.”

Others are treading diplomatically around this central issue of such importance to the people of Palestine and the wider region.

Clause 9 of the plan proposes a role in the Trump-led “Board of Peace” for former British prime minister Tony Blair — a curious choice in a region in which many have not forgotten his government’s support for and role in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

On Monday, Blair praised “a bold and intelligent plan which, if agreed, can end the war, bring immediate relief to Gaza, the chance of a brighter and better future for its people, whilst ensuring Israel’s absolute and enduring security and the release of all hostages.”

But he made no mention of his own proposed role, nor of the Palestinian ambition for statehood.

Kelly Petillo, program manager for the Middle East and North Africa at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Arab News the peace plan “reflects the most the international community can get from the US and Israel given where they are at this stage.”

She said: “It reflects an attempt to balance different considerations, such as appeasing the Israeli public and the army, who want an end to the war, to see hostages return, and the Israeli far-right components of the government, as well as Netanyahu himself, who want to continue it.

“It also reflects pressure on the US, both when it comes to voters who support an end of the war, and by Arab states, which were able to prevent annexation, replace (Trump’s initial) ‘Gaza Riviera’ plan with one that at least does not entail the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and factors in some kind of Palestinian-led entity.”

Right now, there is a determination among leaders globally and regionally not to undermine the plan’s potential by quibbling over details at this stage.

“The plan has been welcomed by the EU, including France and Italy, and the UK, and of course by Arab and Muslim countries, such as Qatar, ������Ƶ and others, who were directly invested in these conversations,” said Petillo.

“There is a clear emphasis among all these actors to make the overall plan work, without focusing too much on the details or single aspects. When asked about specific aspects, so far these actors have been deflecting journalists’ questions.

“The idea is that if you stay vague and do not attach any timeline or specific focus on single aspects or conditions, and rather focus on the big picture, you can at least end the war in the immediate period and secure some kind of breakthrough.

“But of course the problems will likely emerge soon after that.”

Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the non-partisan Middle East Institute specializing in US foreign policy and national security, agrees.

“Like the Holy Roman Empire, which wasn’t very holy or Roman, this is not much of a plan and won’t likely lead to much of a peace,” he told Arab News.

“It’s a fig leaf for the current Israeli government to avoid where the consensus in the Middle East is — in favor of a two-state solution.

“It also lacks a principle of getting a commitment from the Israeli right and violent settlers for peaceful coexistence.”

For Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow for Middle East security at the UK-based Royal United Services Institute, the plan constitutes the most comprehensive peace initiative yet, pulling together several ideas that have been floated in recent months.

“The main hope for success lies in the support this plan seems to have from regional Arab countries and Turkiye,” she told Arab News. “It is not precisely what they may have wanted, but not all sides will get exactly what they want in such a complex and traumatic situation.”

Importantly, she added: “Any post-conflict plan for Gaza requires regional backing to be representative and effective. This cannot be seen as a US-Israel plan that is dictated from the top at the expense of Arab buy-in.

“The main sticking point is what Hamas will do now. Any rejection will be a failure of the Hamas leadership and a failure by Arab negotiators to sufficiently pressure Hamas to comply through a mix of incentives and sticks.

“Make no mistake: While this is an important milestone, it is by no means the end of the road. There is a great deal that needs to happen to disarm Hamas, build a fair and inclusive governance structure that speaks for the Palestinian people, and to ensure Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. But this is a start, and it looks like the best and last option Hamas may have.”

The problem with the plan, said Sir John Jenkins, the former British ambassador to ������Ƶ, Syria and Libya, “is that it’s a technocratic answer to a prior and more fundamental political question: Is a Palestinian state desirable?

“That has always had two very different answers from Israelis and from Palestinians,” he told Arab News. “Why is it going to be different this time, especially since opinion on both sides is so polarized and both Hamas and the Israeli religious right have every incentive to block it? So how does a non-Palestinian international authority make it so?”

Technocracy, he added, “tries to take the politics out of policy.”

He added: “But that age is over. This plan is effectively the 2002 Road Map rebooted and re-engineered for Gaza. The Road Map foundered on politics. My guess is that this will too.”

Arab leaders, said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, “have cautiously supported the Trump-Blair plan because it promises a ceasefire, a hostages-for-prisoners exchange, and a pathway to stabilize Gaza — all important steps seen as preferable to endless war and humanitarian collapse.”

“Yet while the war must end, the plan faces a number of challenges,” she told Arab News. “It excludes Hamas and gives only a vague role to the Palestinian Authority, leaving key Palestinian actors sidelined.”

Furthermore, “it grants Israel broad security leeway without binding obligations, reinforcing power asymmetries; it risks being viewed as foreign trusteeship that undermines Palestinian sovereignty; and it underestimates the immense humanitarian and reconstruction needs.”

Ultimately, she believes, “its lack of clear timelines, enforcement mechanisms, and integration with the broader Palestinian question makes its implementation fragile.”

Hasan Al-Hhasan, senior fellow for Middle East policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Bahrain, expects that “the Arab and Muslim-majority countries who have so far lent their support for Trump’s effort will begin to temper their enthusiasm as Netanyahu’s and Trump’s true intentions — which take little stock of these countries’ interests and preferences — become more apparent.”

The reality, he told Arab News, was that “Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza is a poisoned chalice. While appearing to offer hope for a ceasefire and surge in aid, it surreptitiously provides Israel with a blank check for waging forever war in Gaza with US and Arab approval.

“It includes no timebound commitment on Israel to halt military operations, allows Israel to maintain a permanent military presence in Gaza, and enshrines the separation of Gaza from the West Bank and Palestinian Authority.”��

It was, he added, “not difficult to see why Arab and Muslim-majority countries are backing what they might consider to be their best shot at obtaining a ceasefire, given their desire to put an end to the bloodshed in Gaza and secure a surge in aid.”

But the risk is that “they’re signing on to a plan whose provisions are so vague that it is already being interpreted by Netanyahu as allowing for open-ended Israeli military presence in Gaza with the freedom to wage a forever war under the pretext of fighting Hamas.

“For instance, while the Arab-Muslim statement mentions a ‘full Israeli withdrawal,’ the plan allows Israel to maintain a permanent military presence in a ‘security perimeter’ in Gaza. Netanyahu has since clearly stated, moreover, that he has no intention of withdrawing the Israeli military from Gaza.”��

Furthermore, “the plan, which offers Hamas a safe exit in exchange for surrendering, disarming, and immediately turning over the hostages, is designed to be rejected by the group.

“Netanyahu is hoping to depict Hamas as the obstructionist party and defuse mounting international pressure on Israel through a plan that imposes no real constraint on his ability to continue waging war in Gaza unabated.”

Yossi Mekelberg, senior consulting fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, is likewise skeptical.

“The plan requires the consent of both sides,” told Arab News. “Trump assumes that Israel accepted it as it is, and I am not so sure Netanyahu, under immense pressure from his coalition partners, won’t try to derail it.

“If Hamas refuses it, it won’t be the only one to face the consequences, but ordinary Gazan people too, and this surely can’t be right.

“Moreover, some of the 20 points are actionable and could be implemented immediately, but others are more aspirational, lack details and would require the world’s attention for years. Is this possible?”

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