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Mysterious drone flights in the airspace of EU and NATO countries in recent weeks have alarmed the public and politicians alike. The intrusions, some of which have been blamed on Russia, have reached an unprecedented scale. Many European officials have rushed to describe the incidents as Moscow testing the EU and NATO responses, raising questions about how prepared they are to defend member states after three full years of war between Ukraine and Russia on Europe’s eastern flank. The quick answer is that they are poorly prepared and remain divided despite the existential threats they face.

If anything, the incursions by Russian military drones into Poland and Romania, along with other cheap, nonmilitary drone sightings near key civilian and military installations in Denmark, Norway and Germany, make a perfect case for Europe that modern hybrid warfare is at its doorstep. Meanwhile, its countries squabble over what policies to adopt and who will pick up the bill.

The Ukraine war has once again proven how, in warfare, nothing should be neglected. It has revealed the need for boots and tanks on the ground, as well as air capabilities and counter measures and intelligence and technological supremacy to secure the EU’s eastern front. The bloc also needs to close the holes that could cause disruption or sabotage further to the west — on the ground, in the air, through cyberattacks or all of these combined.

The European Commission’s “drone wall” idea, tabled at last week’s informal EU summit in Denmark, is showing cracks even before intercepting its first Russian intruder. This points to the continued lack of unity across the bloc, even when it needs to immediately spend money on this idea to benefit some of its member states, while the technology could be a precursor to a more elaborate defense dome in the future.

The European Commission’s “drone wall” idea is showing cracks even before intercepting its first intruder

Mohamed Chebaro

Though it falls short of immediate deterrence, once operational, the system would detect and destroy suspicious drones entering EU airspace, based on an intricate system of detection capabilities, such as radars, acoustic sensors and other high-tech tools. It must be capable of detecting all types of drones, including ones that fly at low altitudes, and interface with systems that track them before neutralizing them.

But the initiative, which would protect 10 member states (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Finland), was criticized by Italy and Greece, nations that are reluctant to spend money that does not benefit the EU as a whole.

The apprehension expressed by some EU nations should not be ignored as, despite the urgency to secure its eastern flank, this or any other measure could be bypassed and may never be permanent, since threats and technologies are constantly evolving. Protective measures should also focus on threats emerging from within EU territory, not only at its borders.

The Kremlin, or whichever actor is behind the intrusions, has deployed a form of hybrid deniable warfare against EU and NATO member states that the leaderships of these nations are reluctant to grasp. They are also unwilling to scale up their unity in response. That is not difficult to see. Moscow is using classic military means, such as incursions into Estonian airspace by manned jets or violating Polish and Romanian airspace with unarmed attack drones.

Small, commercially available drones are also being deployed, maybe handled by Russia’s own network of intelligence or special forces operatives or by some drone fanatics, whether paid or unpaid. These disruptive flights have recently caused shutdowns at key Western airports such as those in Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, Berlin and Munich.

It is evident that these threats are a response to the West’s unbroken resolve in its support of Ukraine

Mohamed Chebaro

It is evident that these threats are a response to the West’s unbroken resolve in its support of Ukraine and its willingness to keep delivering money, lethal conventional weaponry and, recently, even strategic longer-range missiles. All this could deny Russia its anticipated victory once the West becomes fatigued and its support falters.

The incursions appear to have been designed to challenge and weaken social and political resilience in key European countries and test NATO’s resolve, unity and responses, as well as its military capabilities. Though there is a tacit belief they could increase in frequency, the West is still working on the premise that such incidents are aimed at causing harassment and are not meant to instigate a larger conflict beyond Ukraine. But mistakes can happen.

Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine but it still has the ability to launch hybrid warfare elsewhere to expose Western vulnerabilities, as seen over recent weeks. It is seeking to exact a higher economic cost on those supporting Ukraine and to weaken their resolve, while sowing anxiety within society.

Plans such as the “drone wall” alone will not be enough. Yes, it would ensure some readiness and enable states to avert any catastrophe, but it is not the strategic response needed to counter the hybrid warfare deployed by Russia. The cost of realizing this idea would likely come from funds for helping Ukraine — and that is what Russia wants.

What the EU needs above all is unity and for its member states to stop showing an inclination to waver. Divisions while the enemy is at the gate are to the detriment of peace, security and prosperity for the nations of the bloc and will surely be exploited by Russia and others.

If the EU does not want to see its airspace, airports and other critical infrastructure disrupted, it ought to unite behind the “drone wall” scheme as a first step. But its members also need to act in ways that counter Moscow’s strategy of scaring the EU. They should dare to deploy something that could alter the cost-benefit calculations of the Kremlin on the tactical and strategic levels. Otherwise, the EU and NATO should brace for the continued testing of their drone resilience today, their infrastructure dependence tomorrow and maybe their democratic societies and liberties the day after.

• Mohamed Chebaro is a British-Lebanese journalist with more than 25 years’ experience covering war, terrorism, defense, current affairs and diplomacy.