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US President Donald Trump had pledged previously to find a solution to the Ukraine war within 24 hours of assuming office. Yet, more than 100 days into his second term, the conflict continues, with no end in sight and key players in Europe now planning for a potentially “long game” ahead.
This development coincides with the 25th anniversary on Wednesday of Vladimir Putin’s first election win as Russian president. A quarter of a century on, Putin’s rule looks likely to continue into the medium term at least, even if his hold on power sometimes seems fragile. He may even break Joseph Stalin’s record of around three decades in office during the time of the Soviet Union.
In this context, and with uncertainty over US policy, despite the recently agreed US-Ukraine minerals deal, Europe is planning with a longer-term horizon. Not only might the Ukraine war endure for months, possibly even years, there is also a possibility that Putin could remain Russian president into the 2030s.
Since European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen began her second five-year term in December, some key decisions on Russia have been repeatedly postponed. Most notably, a plan to end all Russian energy imports to the EU by 2027 was delayed twice this year before its eventual release on Tuesday.
The plan’s release this week may, therefore, prove hugely important. European Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgenson said “no more will we permit Russia to weaponize energy against us. No more will we allow our member states to be blackmailed. No more will we indirectly help fill up the war chest in the Kremlin.”
He highlighted that last year EU countries still paid about €23 billion ($26 billion) to Russia for energy. Moreover, so far in 2025, the EU has imported over €5 billion of Russian energy, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
Key measures and time frames, in what is now intended as a big last push to end the bloc’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels and nuclear materials, are very ambitious in the period to 2027. The plan rests heavily on the EU’s political will, and this will be fortified with several legislative proposals for implementation in coming months.
Monitoring and enforcement of measures will also be stepped up with EU legislation, which will be adopted by qualified majority voting, not unanimity which would give outsized power to states with sympathy to Moscow, including Hungary. There will also be new rules to improve traceability and transparency of Russian energy flows. 

Much progress has been made since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Andrew Hammond

One of the key policies that will help reduce European dependence on Russia is increasing energy supplies from the Middle East. Since 2022, for instance, 22 European energy deals have been announced with the UAE, 11 with Qatar, four with ������Ƶ and two with Oman.
To be sure, much progress has already been made since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This includes the RePowerEU plan by scaling up use of clean energy, while also saving on energy consumption. This has helped generate, at times, more EU-wide electricity from wind and solar sources than from gas.
Even within a year of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia had lost its mantle as the biggest energy supplier to the EU. Moreover, the bloc has since reduced by two-thirds its dependence on Russian pipeline gas plus ended imports of the country’s seaborne oil and coal.
However, there has not been close to a clean break yet, hence the perceived need in Brussels for Tuesday’s plan. The repeated delays to the eventually released document have been slammed by critics. For instance, MEP Beata Szydło even asserted that the postponements were “reached without proper inter-service consultation, and even without the participation of DG ENER management.”
Fast forward from December, and the timing on Tuesday’s announcement coincides with renewed interest in Russian pipeline gas. This includes speculation that the Trump team in Washington might lift sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and other Russian energy initiatives transporting energy to Europe.
So Jorgenson is right that the new roadmap is “not without consequences” and will need to be delivered “in a coordinated way” across the EU. Policy success will be a key test now of the second von der Leyen commission’s political will, while balancing this with much wider strategic goals. This includes an EU desire not to become over-reliant on any other single energy supplier, including the US, which, under the Trump administration, is perceived by many in the bloc to have become a less reliable ally.
There are also wider, key strategic issues. First, a renewed mega-priority for the commission is enhancing economic competitiveness, including via cheaper energy costs. Gas prices in Europe are often multiples of those in the US. Yet, the new plan will completely cut off access to potentially significantly cheaper Russian energy, at least as long as Putin stays in office.
While Putin holds the reins, which seems possible now till at least the 2030 Russian presidential election, Moscow will be seen by much of Europe as a pariah state. Of course, this could change dramatically if a new, reforming, pro-Western leadership comes into power. However, some significant EU sanctions against Russia may remain for as long as Putin remains in the Kremlin, even if the Ukraine war ends. Before Russia invaded, Western sanctions were already in place for violations of international law, including the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

• Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.