Syria, Sudan and the road to Washington

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Despite the major economic focus of President Donald Trump’s Gulf tour earlier this month, Syria was also a one-off political topic, especially after Trump’s with Ahmad Al-Sharaa and the surprise decision to lift US sanctions on the country. Many saw this move as a historic opportunity for the new Syrian government to return to the international stage after years of isolation.
This shift marks a major change in US policy toward Damascus. It was made possible largely by Saudi-led diplomatic efforts, following strong promises by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that he would support Syria’s reintegration into the region and the world. The situation is similar to Sudan’s experience, when the US on Khartoum during Trump’s first term after it the Abraham Accords.
In October 2020, Sudan achieved a breakthrough when the Trump administration removed it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This followed years of sanctions due to Sudan’s past for extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in the 1990s. That decision came after negotiations, with Sudan agreeing to pay compensation to terror victims and to normalize relations with Israel. A signing ceremony at the White House was even expected.
But Sudan did not fully benefit from that opportunity. One key reason was the shift in US leadership, with President Joe Biden taking office in January 2021 and his administration prioritizing other issues. Delays in appointing key officials and a lack of clear policy on Sudan led to the loss of momentum. Eventually, Sudan slipped back into a new kind of isolation — one that worsened after the war began in April 2023, with the collapse of state institutions and a deepening humanitarian crisis.
Syria’s opportunity comes at the start of Trump’s second term, offering a longer period of policy stability — something Sudan never had
Areig Elhag
In contrast, Syria’s opportunity comes at the start of Trump’s second term, offering a longer period of policy stability — something Sudan never had. Both countries suffered from long-term international isolation, but Syria remained under strict US and European sanctions due to war crimes and human rights violations. However, there is now talk of limited contact with the new Al-Sharaa government — different from Sudan’s case, where sanctions were fully lifted but not followed by sustained US engagement.
Still, missed chances do not mean new ones will not arise. Even today, Sudan remains relevant to regional dynamics. But in Washington’s current view, Sudan is often framed primarily as a humanitarian crisis rather than being understood in broader strategic terms, such as counterterrorism, Red Sea maritime security or competition with Russia and Iran.
Sudan’s internal and external actions are watched in Washington, especially when they intersect with US priorities in the region. Its geographic position — between Egypt, ÂÜÀòÊÓÆµ and the Red Sea — gives it significant geostrategic weight. But it is not always presented or perceived as such within American policy circles. Whether it is seen as a strategic actor or a marginal one often depends on how it is framed — and by whom.
Moves like with Iran and allowing a Russian in Port Sudan have sent signals that complicate views of Sudan’s alignment. These developments tend to raise concerns in US policy discussions about the country’s long-term reliability, especially in the context of Red Sea security and broader US strategic interests.
Sudan’s internal and external actions are watched in Washington, especially when they intersect with US priorities in the region
Areig Elhag
From Washington’s perspective, countries that align with American-led frameworks of regional stability, including security cooperation, openness and diplomacy, are more likely to be viewed as potential partners. Those that appear to lean toward confrontation or closer ties with adversarial powers may face more skepticism or reduced engagement. In this context, the signals received from Sudan’s actions, whether deliberate or unintended, shape the space available for US engagement.
Additionally, countries such as ÂÜÀòÊÓÆµ, the UAE and Qatar — as well as Egypt — are viewed as key intermediaries or influencers in Sudan’s trajectory. Their own relationships with Washington give them leverage and relevance when it comes to shaping perceptions of Sudan’s future.
Looking back, Sudan may not have fully capitalized on the opening it received during Trump’s first term. But that doesn’t mean Washington has closed the door. Rather, a new opportunity — under different regional and international conditions — may still be possible. However, the logic here is less about whether Sudan deserves another chance and more about whether its political behavior signals readiness for one.
The fate of nations is not just shaped by opportunities offered, but also by how their actions are interpreted. Even in the midst of a complex crisis, countries can continue to generate interest in US policy circles, especially when their trajectory intersects with emerging American priorities such as securing Red Sea maritime routes, ensuring freedom of navigation, countering terrorism and arms smuggling, and pushing back against the expanding influence of Iran, Russia and China in Africa and along key trade corridors.
Ultimately, the question is not simply: Will another chance come? But rather: How is Sudan positioning itself in the eyes of Washington — and what signals will the US choose to respond to?
- Areig Elhag is a journalist and researcher based in Washington.