������Ƶ

The 17th annual BRICS Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro last week, ended with something of a global shoulder shrug. Last year’s summit in Russia was interpreted by many as a sign that Moscow had found ways of overcoming the diplomatic isolation that accompanied the Ukraine war. The year before, in South Africa, the summit saw the group invite new members, raising hopes a new “BRICS+” could challenge the West’s global dominance.
In contrast, although its members adopted a long list of joint positions in Brazil, the summit appeared lackluster compared to what had gone before. The leaders of four members — Russia, China, Egypt and Iran — opted not to attend, while, despite declarations of unity, clear divisions were visible. For all the hopes that an expanded BRICS could be a voice for the Global South and a rival to the West, has the bubble already burst?
When BRICS voted to expand two years ago, its members declared they sought “greater representation of emerging markets and developing countries” in international institutions. At the same time, China and Russia, which had been the most enthusiastic about expanding membership, stated they hoped to challenge US and Western hegemony, seeing the expanded BRICS as a Global South rival to the G7.
There followed a flurry of optimism. The UAE, Egypt, Iran and Ethiopia became members in 2024, though Argentina declined the invitation and ������Ƶ, despite attending subsequent summits, has not formally joined. Indonesia then became the bloc’s 10th formal member in early 2025. Last year in Kazan, members even discussed launching a new joint currency to challenge the global primacy of the dollar and, unofficially, weaken the effect of US dollar-based sanctions on members like Russia and Iran.
But a year on, the collective mood is less upbeat. The absence of four of the 10 leaders was a blow to the summit’s prestige. Vladimir Putin’s absence was due to a fear of arrest on an International Criminal Court warrant and he spoke by video link, but Xi Jinping’s absence was his first since becoming Chinese premier. Though officially this was due to “scheduling conflict,” some observers suggested Xi’s enthusiasm for BRICS has somewhat waned.
Related to this might be the bloc’s reaction to Donald Trump. Russia and China were among the most supportive of a new BRICS currency to challenge the dollar in Kazan. But on the eve of the Rio de Janeiro summit, Trump declared on social media that any country aligning itself with the “anti-American” policies of BRICS would face an additional 10 percent US tariff — a not very subtle threat about the possible new currency.
This likely contributed to reluctance among other BRICS members, especially India, which fears Chinese dominance of the new currency, to advance the proposal. No major headway was made on the issue and the final joint statement even contained references to the global importance of the dollar — perhaps an effort by some to appease Trump.

With 10 members, there are far more actors at play, making it harder for any consensus to be reached.

Christopher Phillips

But Trump and the new currency were not the only points of disagreement among the members in Brazil. One of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s big hopes for the summit was agreeing proposals to reform international institutions to make them more representative. But two new members, Egypt and Ethiopia, blocked a proposal for South Africa to gain a permanent place on the UN Security Council (along with India and Brazil), arguing it undermined the African Union’s policy of proposing two permanent seats for African states, elected by the continent’s governments.
Another division concerned Iran. While Iran received support from fellow members following the recent attacks by Israel and the US, neither were explicitly condemned. Tensions continued when the final summit declaration called for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but Tehran voiced its opposition, arguing instead for a one-state “South African” resolution.
Chatham House’s Natalie Sabanadze suggested that the rifts in Rio de Janeiro exposed “that not all members are interested in taking sides in a global power confrontation or turning BRICS into a tool to help reshape the global order.” China and Russia, especially, seem to have a different vision for what they want the group to be.
One of the problems is the recent expansion. In a smaller grouping of just five, China and Russia were better able to direct the agenda. With 10 members, plus attendant partners, there are far more actors at play, making it harder for any consensus to be reached, let alone one that satisfies Moscow and Beijing’s anti-Western preferences. While some new members, like Iran, have a history of hostility to the West, others like the UAE and Egypt, remain close partners despite increasingly pursuing their own middle path in international affairs.
Moreover, the expansion has exacerbated existing fault lines. China and India, for example, though cooperative in BRICS, have long been strategic rivals and New Delhi fears Beijing using the grouping to amplify its power. India is now able to use the new members to build support against China’s dominance. Another issue is climate change, with Brazil especially keen to push a united position, but it is restrained by the presence of large fossil fuel providers and carbon dioxide emitters within the expanded group.
These are not easy obstacles to overcome, so it is perhaps unsurprising that, just a few years into its expansion, BRICS does not yet look like the “Global South G7” rivaling the West some hoped it would become. That does not make the task impossible but merely highlights the scale of the challenge.
As G7 leaders will attest, getting any consensus at these summits is often a challenge, even for relatively minor policies. Perhaps then, the limited progress of BRICS+ thus far is as should be expected. While Brazil, China, Russia and the other members have lofty ambitions for the group, they may not, at heart, be the same, which will make further advances and closer alignment in the future a challenge.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.” X: @cjophillips